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Preface
The Telephone Coordination Game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1–10
S. Alpern and M. Pikounis
Abstract
In this paper we extend the work of several authors on the ‘Telephone Coor-
dination Game’ originally proposed as follows by the first author: In each of two
rooms, there are n telephones randomly strewn about. The phones are connected
pairwise in some unknown fashion. There is a player in each room. In each period
0, 1, 2, . . . , each player picks up a phone and says ‘hello’, until the first period when
they hear each other (called a meeting). The common aim of the two players is to
minimize the (expected) number of periods T required to meet. The players do not
have any common labeling of the telephones on which they can coordinate. This
problem is a paradigm of coordination without communication. The problem has
led to a number of papers, some based on modifications of the original version, but
(for n > 2) the original Telephone Problem remains open. The main results of
this paper show that the optimal AW strategies for n = 3 and 4 have additional
optimality properties with respect to a wider class of Markov strategies.
Nonsymmetric Indices of Power and their Application to the House of
Councilors in Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11–26
K. Ano, S. Seko and T. Suzuki
Abstract
This paper deals with the Shapley-Shubik, Banzhaf and nonsymmetric Shapley-
Owen indices of power and their application to the House of Councilors in Japan.
To Work or not to Work: a Note on Incentives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27–37
K. Borissov and S. Pechersky
Abstract
The paper studies employer-employee relationships under information asymme-
try in a form of a contract. An employer hires an employee to perform a task. The
wage of employee is the difference between his compensation level and a dis-utility of
efforts required to achieve the outcome, and this difference depends on the activity
of employee measured in terms of money. In case if all the parameters of model are
common knowledge, equilibrium is found. However, even assuming that only some
of parameters are known precisely to the employer, it is also possible to derive an
equilibrium point. A sensitivity analysis of equilibrium is provided.
Multiple Scenario Competitive Markets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38–54
F.R. Ferna´ndez, L.Monroy, A. Ma´rmol and J. Puerto
Abstract
A new way to analyze competitive economic situations has been introduced.
This analysis is based on considering these problems as bicriteria games. This pa-
per shows the use of these games as a tool for the analysis of economic situations,
that sheds light in market competition when more than one objective or scenario
must be considered. The concept of Pareto-optimal security strategy applied as-
sures the property of security in the individual criteria against opponent’s deviation
in strategy, i.e., the security levels associated to these strategies cannot be improved
componentwise. Other solution concept considered in the paper is the G-goal se-
curity strategy, which includes as part of the solution the probability of obtaining
prespecified values in payoff functions. Thus, this concept permits the players to
measure their attitude toward risk and a strategy will be chosen taken into account
the probability to achieve the different payoffs.
Value of Information in Optimal Stopping Games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55–64
A.Y. Garnaev
Abstract
Sakaguchi (1995) suggested to consider the following two-person non-zero-sum
optimal stopping game being a simple model of bargaining process. The game
consists of at most n steps. Each of two players (I and II) draws a number (x and y
respectively) according to uniform distribution on [0, 1]. Player I(II) knows his hand
x(y) only, and does not know his opponent’s hand. After observing his number each
player can then choose, simultaneously and independently of opponent’s choice,
either to accept (A) his number or to reject (R) it. If the players’ choice-pair is A-A
then the payoff to player I(II) is x(y) and the game is over. If the players’ choice-pair
is R-R, then the current sample (x, y) is rejected, the game passes on to the next
step where each of two players (I and II) draws a number (x and y respectively)
according to uniform distribution on [0, 1] independent of previous step and again
makes his choice. If the players’ choice-pair is A-R or R-A then a lottery is used to
the effect that either A-A or R-R is enforced to the players with probability p or p¯,
where p ∈ [0, 1], p¯ = 1 − p. Every player is to maximize his expected payoff. The
aim of the present paper is to investigate influence of some additional information
which can be obtain by player about his opponent’s number in a Sakaguchi-type
game.
Dixon (1993) suggested to consider the following n person game. Player i re-
ceives a Poisson stream rate qi of independent identically distributed (i.i.d.) U [0, 1]
offers (say, called cakes of different size). Rejected offers are repeatedly passed on
according to an irreducible transition matrix P until either someone accepts the
offer or everyone has seen it, in which case it discarded. It is assumed that this pro-
cess is instantaneous so that there is no delay between the arrival of an offer and its
acceptance by some player or rejection by all. Also, if a player has rejected an offer,
he may not then accept it if it is presented to him again while it is doing the rounds.
This continues until either (i) the time limit expires or (ii) some player accepts an
offer. In case (i) no player earns any reward, otherwise the player (say, player i) who
has accepted an offered cake of size x receives α¯ix part of the cake via a contribution
of αjx from each other player j, where αi ≥ 0, i ∈ [1, n],∑ni=1 αi = 1. The aim of the
present paper is to consider two modifications of this Dixon’s game for two players.
A remarkable feature contained in this work is that in the first model where players
perform their choice consequently they do not bluff in their optimal behavior, in the
meantime simultaneous choice in the second model makes them bluff what makes
this work different from earlier works on games on the Poisson processes (Enns and
Ferenstein (1989), Ravindran and Enns (1992), and Sakaguchi (1991)).
Optimal output Strategies in a Two-Stage Game with Entry, Learning-
by-Doing, and Spillovers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65–72
S. Jørgensen and G. Zaccour
Abstract
The paper identifies the strategic effects of learning-by-doing in presence of un-
intended spillovers of production experience. In a two-stage game an incumbent
and an entrant each produce a homogeneous good. Through his production in the
first period, the incumbent gains experience which reduces the period-two unit cost.
A fraction of this experience is spilled over to the entrant, and reduces the entrant’s
unit cost of production. In contrast to previous studies, we suppose that only one
firm is in the market during the first stage and learning is not necessarily symmetric.
A Minimum Taxrate Core Allocation of Bin Packing Games . . . . 73–79
T. Matsui
Abstract
This paper deals with a class of cooperative games called bin packing games.
We show that the problem for checking emptiness of the core of a bin packing game
is NP-complete. We propose a pseudo polynomial time algorithm for finding an
allocation in ∗-core of bin packing games.
Guaranteed Imputation in the Game Without Side Payments . . 80–90
E.N. Opletayeva
Abstract
We consider three-person cooperative game under uncertainty and without side
payments
Γ = 〈{1, 2, 3}, {Xi}i=1,2,3, Y, {fi(x, y)}i=1,2,3〉.
The game proceeds in the following manner. Each player i chooses his strategy
xi ∈ Xi ⊆ Rni (i = 1, 2, 3); as a result, the situation x = (x1, x2, x3) ∈ X1 ×X2 ×
X3 = X ⊆ Rn (n = n1 + n2 + n3) is formed; the payoff function fi(x, y) of player
i (i = 1, 2, 3) is determined by pairs (x, y) ∈ X × Y . The goal of each player is to
choose a strategy so as to obtain the largest possible payoff (the value of his payoff
function on pair (x, y) ∈ X × Y ). Here the players must be aware of the fact that
any unpredictable uncertainty y ∈ Y can be realizable in advance.
In this paper we discuss the notion of imputation, which is based on the principle
of the guaranteed result in the game Γ and we also take into account the cooperative
nature of the game.
The Value of Dynamic Games with Partial Cooperation . . . . . . . . 91–104
L. Petrosyan and D. Ayoshin
Abstract
In this paper the partial cooperative games (PCG) in extensive form are con-
sidered. The main peculiarity of PCG is that the behavior of each player is a
combination of cooperative and individual behaviors. A construction method of the
optimal game trajectory is proposed.
Repeated Game of Criminal vs Police-Incomplete-Information
Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105–120
M. Sakaguchi
Abstract
In this paper a conflict between a potential criminal offender and a law- enfor-
coment authorities is investigated. Continueing the previous work [10] the model
we study is a non-zero-sum two-period game under incomplete information, where
each player doesn’t know whether the opponent is unable to act, or can act at most
two times during the two periods. We study the game in the Bayesian approach
and derive Bayesian equilibria of three one-period games and one two-period game
under various information structures, each in an explicit form depending on the
parameter values of the game. It is shown that, just as our common sense suggests,
the equilibrium goes to ”act-act” choice-pair, (i.e. criminal commits crime, when
police places an alert against him) as offender’s illeagal income, comming from an
unpunished crime, increases. Also we give a numerical example which corroborates
the theoretical analysis.
Guaranteed Imputation for the Linear-Quadratic Game Under
Unsertainty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121–129
E.B. Smirnova
Abstract
In this work the sufficient conditions of existence of Slater-guaranteed imputation
are obtained in the cooperative linear-quadratic game of three persons without
side payments in which actions of disturbances, noise or other uncertainties are
recognized. Ways of a formalization of solutions of games under uncertainty are
used from [Zhukovskiy, 1996, Zhukovskiy, Chikrii, 1994].
Hurwitz’s Principle for one Class of the Non-Cooperative
Games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130–133
L.V.Smirnova
Abstract
The main result of paper is the theorem about the existence of equilibrium in
a non-cooperative game under uncertainty. It is important that in a definition of
the game, payoff to a player depends not only on a strategy profile formed by all
players, but also depends on an uncertainty with values from the given set. For
this type of game an equilibrium concept, called the NH-solution, is introduced. It
coincides with Nash equilibrium in a game with special payoff functions without
uncertainties constructed in accordance with the Hurwitzs principle. Under some
conditions, the existence of a NH-solution in mixed strategies is proved.
N-Person Games on Territory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134–141
Y. Teraoka and H. Hohjo
Abstract
This paper considers a class of games which is suggested from the competition of
production development in manufacturing and the logic of animal conflict. There are
n players, Player 1, · · · , n (n ≥ 2), complete to obtain a territory for the existence.
Each of them has to select a stopping time of his investing time and energy to occupy
the territory. The winner is the one who keeps the investing for the longest time
among the n players, and he can monopolize the territory immediately he occupies
it. The territory has the value v(t) depending on time t ∈ [0,∞). Therefore, once
a player monopolize the territory at time x ∈ [0,∞), he can get all values V (x)
possessed by the territory after that time, i.e., V (x) =
∫∞
x v(t)dt. While, the losers
are players who give up to invest earlier, and he can not get anything. However, each
of the n players has to spend the cumulative cost H(x) if he intends to invest time
and energy until time x ∈ [0,∞). As well as in games of timing, we introduce two
patterns of information available to the players, i.e., silent version and noisy version,
here. We derive an optimal strategy, i.e., an optimal stopping plan based on the
information structure, from a view point of Nash equilibrium, since the model yields
us a certain class of n-person non-zero sum infinite games on [0,∞)× · · · × [0,∞).
Demand Operations in Minimum Spanning Tree Games . . . . . . . . 142–155
M. Tsurumi, T. Minamiura, T. Tanino, M. Inuiguchi
Abstract
In this paper new demand operations in minimum spanning tree games are
proposed. Any allocation obtained through a demand operation by a coalition on a
Bird tree allocation is an element of the core of the minimum spanning tree game.
However, some of the obtained allocations still do not belong to the core of the
monotonic cover game. Hence, a revised weak demand operation is proposed. Any
allocation obtained through the revised operation on a Bird tree allocation is an
element of both the cores of the minimum spanning tree game and the monotonic
cover game. Therefore, every obtained allocation has no negative element, and
hence the revised weak demand operation is more applicable than the original one.
Take-Away Games with a Constant Lower Restriction . . . . . . . . . 156–161
S.V. Vinnichenko
Abstract
Epp and Ferguson obtained a solution to take-away games. Such game is deter-
mined by a natural number M and a nondecreasing function f(n). In the beginning
the first player can remove from a pile any positive number of counters k which is
not greater than M. On the next move the second player can remove from a pile any
positive number of counter k′ which is not greater than f(k), etc. The player re-
moving the last counter becomes a winner. In the present paper we consider similar
games with a constant lower restriction.
Dynamic Game with Continuum of Players Modelling ”Tragedy of the
Commons” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162–187
A. Wiszniewska-Matyszkiel
Abstract
The paper deals with a dynamic game of extraction of common renewable re-
sources by players constituting a nonatomic measure space. the general model
applies both to the continuous and discrete time.
The questions of the existence and properties of equilibria are considered. An-
other issue is a tax-subsidy system, with socially acceptable properties, enforcing
an equilibrium which is Pareto optimal and at least as good as the one arising after
introduction of private property.
Constructing the Nash Equilibrium in a Game Statement
of Carnot Duopoly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188–197
A. Zavarin
Abstract
This paper addresses the problem of finding the Nash equilibrium in a Game
Statement of Carnot Duopoly. In the model there are two firms. Both firms produce
the same type of a good, however in a different quantity, which accounts for x and
y units. The Nash Equilibrium is found for the static model of Carnot duopoly as
well as for the differential game in a continuous case, when x and y are changing
continuously over time.
